We investigate the proof structure and models of theories of classes, where classes are`collections' of entities. The theories are weaker than set theories and arise from a study of type classes in programming languages, as well as comprehension schemata in categories. We introduce two languages of proofs, one a simple type theory and the other involving proof environments for storing and retrieving proofs. The relationship between these languages is de ned in terms of a normalisation result for proofs. We use this result to de ne a categorical semantics for classes and establish its coherence. Finally, we show how the formal systems relate to type classes in programming languages.
Introduction
The classes of the title are collections of entities. We choose this term as more neutral than sets, as we have a precise idea of the rather primitive theory we wish to explore which is quite distant from a set theory. The theory focuses on the extent (or extension or abstraction) or, as we shall say, the comprehension of a predicate , by which we mean the class of entities of class K which satisfy , a class which we write, using a fairly standard notation, as fx : K j g where x is a variable possibly occurring in formula .
The formal systems we present arise from two sources. One source is the notion of type classes in programming languages. Type classes were introduced in Wadler, Blott 89] and provide a systematic treatment of implicit conversion between structures using operator overloading. Type classes have been incorporated in functional languages such as Haskell Hudak, Wadler 1990] and Gofer Jones 1992] . The reader need not know of type classes to understand this paper, but should be aware that the theory we present is a reformulation of (and extension of) the theory of type classes described in Hilken, Rydeheard 1992 ]. There we described a primitive functional language with type classes and gave a semantics in categorytheoretic terms. A major part of the work lay in showing that this semantics was properly de ned, needing a so-called coherence result. The present paper attempts a reconstruction of a language of type classes as a language of proofs of a simple logic. In this way, we extend the propositions-as-types correspondence (see, for example, Girard et al. 1989] ) to cover type classes. However, in doing so we deviate from standard methods of presenting logics and the formulation here is closer to a programming language in that it includes`environments' as well as contexts.
The other source for this theory of classes is the notion of a comprehension schema introduced into category theory in Lawvere 1970 ]. Lawvere formulates a comprehension schema as an adjoint in an indexed category and shows how such schemata capture the`extent' of a predicate. We describe comprehension schemata later in the paper and use this link to categories to provide models for the formal systems of classes.
There is a super cial resemblance between the formal systems presented in this paper and set theories, especially those in Natural Deduction form as in Fitch 1952] , Prawitz 1965] and Halln as 1988] . However, what we present di ers from these set theories in that, in the systems in this paper, (1) there are no variables ranging over classes, and (2) there is no membership predicate, so that in the expression fx : K j g, the proposition does not include membership.
Instead of membership there are judgements of the form ?`t : K, in which a term t is assigned to a class K in context ?. As a result, classes as described here are quite di erent from sets. For instance, we cannot formulate paradoxes such as Russell's paradox. Set theories in Natural Deduction form may admit proofs of paradoxes but these proofs fail to normalise under a proof rewriting system. For the simpler formal systems in this paper, proof rewriting is strongly normalising.
Overview
To analyse classes we introduce three formal systems and examine the relationship between them. We begin with a simple system C which deals with classes, terms classi ed by classes, and formulae. The class comprehension rules are in such a form that the usual correspondence between terms and proofs of their well-formedness cannot be obtained directly. However, in a version of the system where terms are explicitly enriched with some proof information, we may reconstruct a proof of the well-formedness of a term from its syntax. For the judgements of the resulting system C Der , equality is introduced and axiomatised. A decision procedure for this equality is given in terms of a normal form for judgements (the`long -normal form').
As an alternative, to cope with proofs in the original system C, another formal system, C Env , is introduced, where the extra proof components are stored, not in the terms, but in the context, in a`proof environment'. It is this system that we consider to be a language of`type classes' in a way that is explained towards the end of the paper (Section 6). The systems C Env and C Der are then related by providing translations from derivations and judgements of C Env to judgements of C Der . It is shown that the two translations are consistent with each other, and so the translation of the resulting judgement given as the translation of its derivation is actually independent of the derivation. This in turn is used to prove a coherence result, which can be used to de ne maps on derivable judgements of C Env by induction on their derivation. These results rely on the decision procedure for equality in C Der .
As an application, we consider a model theory for the systems. For the rst order system C Der , models in strict indexed categories with comprehension schemata are formalised (based upon Lawvere 1970] ), a semantics of judgements in such models is given, and a soundness theorem is proved (completeness holds as well). This provides a basis for a semantics of C Env , given straightforwardly using the coherence result. Finally, we show how this relates to type classes in programming languages.
A formal system of classes
We begin by describing a rst order system C which incorporates a notion of comprehension.
The system is presented as a sequent calculus in a Natural Deduction style Prawitz 1965] . It consists of terms t which are classi ed by what we call classes K, and we write t : K. Properties of terms are described by propositional formulae which may have free variables for which terms may be substituted.
A note about terminology: Type theory and proof theory each come with their own terminology, which, in the systems we present can lead to confusion. In t : K, we would normally call K the type of t. But as a type theory, t itself is a type and K, which classi es types, is often called a kind. To prevent confusion, we avoid speaking of`types' and call t a term and K its class.
We rst describe the system and then explain why it is as it is. We begin with the contexts and judgements of C. Contexts are of two forms:
Class contexts ? ::= x 1 : K 1 ; : : : ; x n : K n Formula contexts ::= 1 ; : : : ; n for n 0. In class contexts x 1 : K 1 ; : : : ; x n : K n the variables x i are all distinct. Empty contexts may be omitted in judgements. ?; ` means that the formulae entail in a context with free variables declared in ?.
As a vocabulary for C we introduce a signature, , of symbols and axioms (strictly speaking we should write C and will do so when required):
1. a collection of class symbols (metavariable A ranging over them); 2. a collection of predicate symbols, each with a given (possibly empty) class of arguments, thus if P K 1 ;:::;Kn is a predicate symbol of (well-formed) classes K 1 ; : : : ; K n and t i is a term of class K i (for i = 1; : : : ; n), then P K form of the Elim1 rule means that terms can belong to more than one class. In type theory, there are good reasons for avoiding this multiple classi cation of terms, whereas, for classes viewed as sets and for functional programming, it is a natural requirement. The well-formedness of formula is necessary in the Intro rule, as the only other occurrence of is a substitution instance of it. Strictly speaking, the Intro rule should be viewed as schematic over the well-formedness condition, that is, for each such that x : K` prop there is an Intro rule without the wellformedness condition. In presenting formal systems, this distinction is not usually drawn so that well-formedness conditions become hypotheses of rules. However, in a categorical treatment (Section 5) this distinction becomes clear. This explains the absence of an elimination rule to produce the conclusion x : K` prop. In the expression fx : K j g, x is bound and there are no other free variables in . More generally, we may wish to consider a higher-order class structure in which classes are parameterised. This would extend the present notion of type classes in programming and, when we come to consider models, necessitate a further level of indexing of categories. Logical systems which include parameterised comprehension forms have been investigated by Halln as Halln as 1988] amongst others. The additional formula context in the second elimination rule makes weakening admissible in the system. Example 2.1. Here is a simple example of derivations in C. We shown that we may derive z : fx : A j P A (x)g from z : fy : fx : A j P A (x)g j P A (y)g. We give two derivations of this result.
The derivations di er in substance in a way we make precise in the next section.
Let ? be the context z : fy : fx : A j P A (x)g j P A (y)g. The following is a derivation tree of z : fx : A j P A (x)g from ?.
. The remainder of the paper is devoted to an analysis of system C, beginning with languages for the derivations in C and then models for these languages and, nally, relating them to languages with type classes.
A calculus of proofs (I)
We begin the analysis of system C by examining the structure of its derivations. In doing so, not only do we provide proof-theoretic results, but also we set up machinery for de ning semantics later (Section 5).
Our starting point is fairly standard: we introduce a language C Der of derivations in C. This language is a type theory whose judgements are in bijective correspondence to the derivations in C. In this type theory, we view class comprehension as a form of strong sum type.
For each inference rule in C, we introduce a form of expression building proofs of the conclusion of the rule from proofs of the hypotheses. Here are some of the points involved: The inference rules (Figures 3 and 4) are unchanged from those of C except those for propositional consequence and those for class comprehension. Example 3.1. As an example, we give an expression in C Der for the two derivations in C in Example 2.1 in which, from z : fy : fx : A j P A (x)g j P A (y)g, we derived z : fx : A j P A (x)g.
Corresponding to the rst derivation is the rather unwieldy expression:
?` 1 (x:A)P A (x) ( 1 (z)); 2 (z)] (x:A)P A ( where ? is z : fy : fx : A j P A (x)g j P A ( 1 (x:A)P A (x) (y))g and the subscript is (y : fx : A j P A (x)g)P A ( 1 (x:A)P A (x) (y)). This directly encodes the Intro and Elim structure of the original derivation. For example, it ends with a fg-Intro of a term built from a judgement ?` 1 (x:A)P A (x) ( 1 (z)) : A, a judgement x : A`P A (x) prop and a proof of satisfaction 2 (z).
The second derivation of z : fx : A j P A (x)g from z : fy : fx : A j P A (x)g j P A (y)g corresponds to the simple judgement:
?` 1 (z) : fx : A j P A (x)g where ? and are as above.
We complete the description of C Der by introducing a relationship of equality between judgements. This equality allows us to: 1. link derivations and judgements in systems of classes in such a way that we can de ne maps on derivable judgements by de ning maps on derivations, in particular de ning semantics of systems of classes, and 2. examine the notion of`essentially distinct' derivations and count them. Results of this form are called`coherence' results and have been extensively studied in category theory (see Mac Lane 1982] for example) and in proof theory (see Curien 1990 ] and Curien, Ghelli 1990] for example).
The appropriate equality ( Figure 5 ) arises as a description of equivalence of proofs under inversion principles ' Prawitz 1965] . It includes both the usual -rules, where an introduction is followed by an elimination, and also -rules, where an elimination is followed by an introduction. Equality is at the level of judgements rather than at the level of constituents of judgements (such as terms). This is forced by the dependency between the syntax of classes, propositional formulae, terms and proofs, so that an equality on syntax of one of these induces equality on ?` j K 1 ;K 2 (ht 1 ; t 2 i) : K j = ?`t j : K j (j = 1; 2) the others. The equations for the symbols in the signature ( Figure 6 ) assert that if a symbol occurs in with a given`type', then it also occurs at any equal`type'. The equational theory is generated from the equations in Figures 5 and 6 using the rules of symmetry and transitivity, together with the rules of congruence, i.e. the rules of C Der adapted for equations. For example, the class formation rule for equations is: K class =`K 0 class x : K` prop = x : K 0` 0 prop fx : K j g class =`fx : K 0 j 0 g class As in -calculus, it is possible (though rather unintuitive) to present the system entirely in terms of equations. Derivability of judgement J is then the derivability of J = J.
We give, in the next two propositions, some standard properties of formal systems as they Proof. Each case of Proposition 3.1 is established by structural induction on the rst judgement. For Proposition 3.2, parts (1), (2) and (3) are established by induction on the derivation of equality. (4) is by structural induction on the judgement and the derivation of equality.
Solving a word problem for C Der
This section contains the analysis on which much of the remainder of the paper relies. We solve a`word problem' for C Der by presenting a decision procedure for equality in C Der , a procedure which, given two derivable judgements J 1 and J 2 in C Der , will decide whether or not they are equal under the equations of C Der . The link between decision procedures and`coherence' results is well-known (see for example Curien, Ghelli 1990 ], Curien 1990 ]) and will be illustrated later in the paper (Section 4).
The decision procedure operates by converting expressions to a`canonical form', such that expressions are equal in C Der i their canonical forms are syntactically identical. Because of the presence of both -and -rules, canonical forms cannot be computed by rewriting terms to a normal form under a simple rewrite system. A more delicate notion of canonical form is necessary in which the class of a term has a role as well as the form of the term itself. The de nition of canonical form that we give is an adaptation of the`long ' normal forms of -calculus (see Huet 1976] and Jay 1991]). We rst de ne the appropriate notion of canonical form and then describe a procedure for converting judgements into this form. For judgements ?`t : K canonical forms are -expanded versions of t according to the form of class K. In the remaining cases, canonical forms arereduced (hence we introduce reduced forms), except at predicate, term and axiom symbols, when further -expansion is necessary.
De nition 3.1 We de ne when a well-formed judgement is canonical. For (2), we describe a procedure C to convert judgements to canonical form. For judgements ?`t : K we -expand t according to the form of K and then, when no further expansion is possible, we -reduce the result using conversion R. This is the content of the following de nition. C(?`t : K) = R(?)`C(t : K) where C(t : K) is de ned by structural induction on K as follows:
A On other forms of judgement C is de ned directly in terms of R:
The conversion R is de ned on terms by:
in if t 0 t 00 ; 00 ] then t 00 else 1 (x:R(K))R( ) (t 0 ) R(k K 1 ;:::;Kn!K (t 1 ; : : : ; t n )) = k K 0 1 ;:::;K 0 n !R(K) (t 0 1 ; : : : ; t 0 n ) where t 0 j : K 0 j = C(t j : K j ) Here is syntactic identity used in pattern matching. On other expressions, R is de ned simply in terms of their structure, except again using -expansion when symbols of are encountered and -reduction for the projection 2 :
R(fx : K j g) = fx : R(K) j R( )g R(P K 1 ;:::;Kn (t 1 ; : : : ; t n )) = P K 0 1 ;:::;K 0 n (t 0 1 ; : : : ; t 0 n ) where t 0 j : K 0 j = C(t j : K j ) R(v) = v R(a K 1 ;:::;Km; 1 ;:::; n! (t 1 ; : : : ; t m ; 1 ; : : : ; n )) = a R(K 1 );:::;R(Km);R( 1 );:::;R( n)!R( 0 ) (t 0 1 ; : : : ; t 0 m ; R( 1 ); : : : ; R( n )) where t 0 j : K 0 j = C(t j : K j ) R( 2 (x:K) (t)) = let t 0 = R(t) in if t 0 t 00 ; 00 ] then 00 else 2 (x:R(K))R( ) (t 0 ) Despite the interplay of -expansion and -reduction, the termination of this on derivable judgements is not di cult to establish. The -reduction is that of projections for products and comprehension and so does not involve substitution (as it does in -calculus). -reduction by itself therefore terminates. For uniformity, let us change notation and write C(e; ) for R(e), and view the above as a rewriting system. We order C(e; T) as the lexical product of the following orders:
1. C(e; T) < C(e 0 ; T 0 ), when T is a (strict) subterm of T 0 , or T (and T 0 does not), 2. C(e; T) < C(e 0 ; T 0 ) when e is a -reduced form of e 0 , 3. C(e; T) < C(e 0 ; T 0 ) when e and e 0 are the same except that some occurrences of C in the term structure of e 0 are lower in the term structure of e or absent. To handle the duplication arising in the rule for C(t : K 1 K 2 ), for example, we make the termination order @ the multiset order of the above lexical product. Then @ is wellfounded and, for each of the above rules, RHS @ LHS. Now, to complete the proof, we have C(J) = J in C Der since conversion steps arise from the equations of C Der . That C(J) is canonical is by construction (by induction on the termination order). Finally, if J 1 = J 2 then C(J 1 ) = J 1 = J 2 = C(J 2 ) and thus (using (1)) C(J 1 ) C(J 2 ).
Remark. The canonical forms described here are canonical for both the product and comprehension structure. There is a looser notion of canonical form which is canonical for the comprehension structure alone. A fg-canonical form is de ned as above (including the -expansion at product type) but j K 1 ;K 2 (t) is de ned to be reduced simply when t is reduced. The conversion to canonical form is likewise modi ed: (t) k K 1 ;:::;Kn!K (t 1 ; : : : ; t n ) = k K 1 ;:::;Kn!K (t 1 ; : : : ; t n ) A = A K 1 K 2 = K 1 K 2 fx : K j g = fx : K j g P K 1 ;:::;Kn (t 1 ; : : : ; t n ) = P K 1 ;:::;Kn (t 1 ; : : : ; t n ) These maps interact properly: A derivation D in C is a derivation of J(D ? (D)) (proof: simple structural induction on D) and hence, for judgement J in C Der , D(J) is a derivation of J(J) in C and so, for all derivable J in C Der , J(J) is derivable. This section is an aside from the main development of the paper and may be omitted by the reader. We describe the relationship between equality in C Der and the derivations in C, giving a`coherence' result which allows us to count the number of distinct derivations of a judgement in C. We give a brief outline of results, motivating them with examples.
The example to bear in mind here is the two derivations of the same judgement given in Example 2.1. They di er because the predicate symbols on the right of the turnstile are derived from di erent occurrences in the context. To capture this, we follow standard treatment of such coherence results (see Mac Lane 1982] ) and introduce an appropriate notion of a graph which links occurrences of symbols.
For simplicity, we begin with a much reduced form of system C. We drop product classes and, amongst the symbols in , admit only class symbols A and predicate symbols P K 1 ;:::;Kn (no term formation symbols or axioms).
For each class expression in this reduced system, we extract the tree of its predicate symbols as follows: kfx 3 : fx 2 : fx 1 : A j P A (x 1 )g j Q fx 1 :A j P A (x 1 )g (x 2 )g j R fx 1 :A j P A (x 1 )g (x 3 )gk = P kAk ; Q kfx 1 :A j P A (x 1 )gk ; R kfx 1 :A j P A ( We are interested in which trees correspond to well-formed classes. Such trees have the property that, at each node, the predicate symbols of the children of the node are a selection (including repetition) of those predicate symbols that occur as siblings to the left of the node. Thus, in the above example, the P A which occurs as a child of R occurs also to the left of R at the same level as R in the tree. In general, child nodes may occur several times to the left of the node, in which case each choice corresponds to a distinct derivation. We thus label occurrences of predicate symbols with their \justifying" occurrence. In the above example, the P A which occurs as a child of R is labelled with 1 to indicate that it derives from the rst sibling of R.
De nition 3.2 A graph (for this reduced system) is a tree of predicate symbols, each predicate symbol P not at the root being labelled with a natural number n such that, if (P; n) is a child of a node, then P occurs as the n-th sibling of the node (from left to right) and this sibling is to the left of the node. Moreover, for each predicate symbol P, the subtrees at all occurrences of P are identical.
The last condition says that predicate symbols come with xed classes of argument. From a tree which supports a graph structure, we may construct a unique (to within -conversion and choice of class symbols) well-formed class expression: the tree T = P 1 T 1 ; P 2 T 2 ; : : : ; P m Tm ] giving the class e T = fx m : f fx 2 : fx 1 : A j P 1 f
Tm (x m )g: For a judgement J = x 1 : K 1 ; : : : ; x n : K n`xj : K; (1 j n) to be well-formed (i.e. derivable) the predicate symbols in K must be drawn from those in K j in exactly the same way that predicate symbols are linked in a graph. Thus if we introduce a special predicate symbol to stand from the turnstile, then a graph for J is a graph on the tree kfx j : K j j K (x j )gk.
That such a graph exists for derivable judgements, is a consequence of the following.
Proposition 3.4 For this reduced form of system C, there is a bijective correspondence between graphs for a derivable judgement J in C and fg-canonical forms C such that J(C) J.
Note that this says that the number of distinct derivations of judgement J in C (equational classes of judgements J 0 in C Der such that D(J 0 ) = J) is the number of graphs for J.
The construction of a canonical form proceeds by structural induction on judgement J in C. Conversely, the construction of a graph from a canonical form proceeds by structural induction on the canonical form. We illustrate here the exact correspondence between graphs and canonical forms. In Example 2.1, the rst derivation of z : fy : fx : A j P A (x)g j P A (y)g`z : fx : A j P A (x)g ? ( ) in C corresponds to the canonical form:
?` 1 (x:A)P A (x) ( 1 (z)); 2 (z)] (x:A)P A (x) : fx : A j P A (x)g ? (1) where ? is z : fy : fx : A j P A (x)g j P A ( 1 (x:A)P A (x) (y))g and the subscript is (y : fx : A j P A (x)g)P A ( 1 (x:A)P A (x) (y)). The other derivation of ( ) is not in canonical form (it ends with a projection but is of comprehension class) but equals the following canonical form:
?` 1 (x:A)P A (x) ( 1 (z)); 2 (x:A)P A (x) ( 1 (z))] (x:A)P A (x) : fx : A j P A (x)g ? (2)
The two graphs corresponding to these canonical forms are, for (1) P ] ; P ] ; (P ] ;2)] ] and for (2), P ] ; P ] ; (P ] ;1)] ] di ering only in the index of the third occurrence of P indicating which of the two previous occurrences is the justifying occurrence.
The link between canonical forms and graphs lies in the projections which indicate which occurrences of predicate symbols are being used. In more detail, each occurrence of 1 under a 2 moves the justifying occurrence to the left one place. Thus no 1 means that the justifying occurrence is immediately to the left of the node, one occurrence means that the justifying occurrence is two places to the left of the node, etc. This observation can be turned into a description of a bijective correspondence.
To extend this result to include products we consider multiple graphs with shared substructure and Proposition 3.4 is modi ed so that J(C) is not identical to J but is equal in the equational theory of products E( ). Term constructor symbols and axioms each set up a correspondence between predicate symbols which xes part of the graph structure. We then count only graphs varying over this xed substructure. A full account of this would be out of place here but will appear elsewhere. 
Propositional logic
We now explain how to extend the above formal systems to include propositional logic. We introduce logical constants, inference rules and an equality on proofs of propositions based onand -rules. The key idea is that we do not change the decision procedure to accommodate these new equations. Thus the procedure yields canonical forms which are no longer unique for each equational class, but are unique only to with the equational theory of propositional proofs. A decision procedure for this equational theory, which may well be available, would then provide a full decision procedure. However, this is not what is required for coherence: it introduces too ne a distinction. Perhaps we labour the point here but such structural independence properties (`extensibility' and`modularity' results) are important in the incremental design of programming languages.
To illustrate these ideas we we choose a fairly minimal propositional logic containing only constants > (true) and^(conjunction). We add the standard inference rules for > and (  Figure 7 ) to C Der to de ne C Der (>;^). The -and -rules for > and^are: ?; ` : > = ?; ` : > ?; ` j 1 ; 2 (h 1 ; 2 i) : j = ?; ` j : j j = 1; 2 ?; `h 1 1. Canonical forms are equal in C Der (>;^) i they are equal in E(>;^), 2. For each derivable judgement J in C Der (>;^) there is a canonical form C(J) with C(J) = J in C Der (>;^) and such that J 1 = J 2 in C Der (>;^) i C(J 1 ) = C(J 2 ) in E(>;^).
The conversion to canonical form C is de ned as previously but incorporating the above notion of reduced form for the new expressions. Notice that there is no -expansion for expressions of type > or 1^ 2 .
Following this example, other logical constants such as (implication), _ (or) and ? (false) as well as quanti cation may be added. Implication introduces a -calculus of proofs v : : . We may also consider adding recursion to this system. Of course, we will need to modify the notion of model to cope with these additional constructs. For , _, ? and quanti cation, the relevant categorical structure is well-known (see Lawvere 1970] , for example).
A calculus of proofs (II)
We now present an alternative language, which we call C Env , of derivations in the system of classes C. In the previous system C Der , the judgements are judgements of C modi ed with su cient proof information to enable us to reconstruct a unique derivation. This additional proof information resides in the expressions of the modi ed language. As an alternative, we keep the language as close as possible to C and store the required proof information not in the expressions but in the context, in what we call proof environments. This is a rather radical departure from a logical viewpoint but is a very natural idea for programming languages. Indeed, it is this system C Env that is a`language of type classes' and a major purpose of the paper is to analyse type classes by reference to the underlying logical system C (see Section 6). Let us begin by looking again at the introduction rule for class comprehension in C:
?`t : K x : K` prop ?;` t=x] ?`t : fx : K j g What is missing from the conclusion is the proof of satisfaction ?;` t=x]. Instead of modifying the term t to include , we extend the context to include proofs of satisfaction together with a means of accessing the correct proof for any assertion that a term belongs to a class.
This idea is familiar from programming where we bind names to expressions for later use. Sequences of named expressions are called environments (sometimes de nitions, stores, states or bindings). For example, in a -calculus we might have an environment x = 3; f = ( x : int:x + 1):
We call the de ned constants x and f operators (a terminology re ecting their use in type classes). In this environment, we may form judgements such as x = 3; f = ( x : int:x + 1)`f(3) = x + 1: Environments di er from contexts which declare variables. In the above, x and f are not variables standing for hypothetical values which may be substituted with actual terms. However, we may substitute like for like, so that x may be replaced with 3 in f(3) = x + 1. Neither are environments general equational theories: We need access to unique occurrences of the operators. This uniqueness does not forbid some re-use of operators. For example, (if f(true) then f(0) else f(1)) = 2 In the latter case, we can disambiguate the operator f at each occurrence using the type information.
We now apply these ideas to the description of proofs. We rst introduce proof environments, . A proof environment is a sequence of entries of the form o t] = where o is an operator (simply a name), t a term and a proof of a propositional formula t=x]. Thus, is the proof that t satis es . It is this proof that is required for the Intro rule for class comprehension and it may be accessed in a proof environment by operator o. This proof has no free proof variables (there is no formula context in the third hypothesis in the Intro rule).
Previously, for a term to belong to a class we wrote t : fx : K j g
This will no longer su ce. We modify the assertion so that we can access the proof of satisfaction t=x] in a given proof environment. Just as the formulae ranges over possible terms t in the class, so does the proof of satisfaction. We thus write, Neither terms t nor proofs of satisfaction in o t] = contain free proof variables v, hence it makes sense to order the contexts and environments as ?; ; . Thus the forms of judgement, modi ed from those of C Der , are: K class means that K is a well-formed class, ?; ` prop means that is a well-formed propositional formula with free variables declared in context ?, and operators de ned in the proof environment , ?; `t : K means that t is a well-formed term of class K with free variables declared in ? and and operators de ned in the proof environment , ?; ; ` : means that is a proof that entails in a context with free variables declared in ? and operators de ned in the proof environment .
In the inference rules for C Env , we avoid introducing well-formedness condition for contexts ?; . Instead, we ensure that whenever an item in is exhibited, the well-formedness of its constituents is ensured. A general assumption rule, involving a well-formed ?; , is replaced by rules of exchange, weakening and a special assumption rule. These structural rules ( Figure  8 ) are routine { they are included here for completeness of the description. The remainder of the rules (Figure 9 ) are those of C Der (modi ed to include proof environments) except those for comprehension where the operators o give access to proofs of satisfaction and the rst elimination rule reverts to an analogue of that in C. The rules for the symbols in are those of C Der except that proof environments occur in the contexts.
Example 4.1. Let us look at a derivation in this system to see how proof environments work. We present a derivation of a judgement that corresponds to the rst derivation in C in 
Relating the formal systems
We now consider the relationship between the system of proof environments C Env and that of explicit proofs C Der . In what sense is the formal system of proof environments C Env a description of derivations in C? It may be imagined that we can reconstruct a derivation (a judgement in C Der ) from a judgement in C Env by simply replacing operators with the proofs to which they are associated in the environment. Each derivable judgement in C Env has su cient proofs in the proof environment for such a reconstruction, but how these proofs are to be assembled into an actual proof is not uniquely determined by the judgement.
In this section, we give a construction of judgements in C Der from judgements in C Env . This construction K is de ned on derivable judgements in C Env and yields canonical judgements in C Der (as de ned in Section 3.1). To show that the construction is de ned on derivable judgements we introduce a further correspondence, E, this time from derivations in C Env to judgements in C Der . The canonical nature of the results of the rst correspondence allows us to show that the two correspondences`cohere' in a way we make precise below.
We de ne the map K from judgements in C Env to judgements in C Der . The key idea is as follows: For judgements ?; `t : fx : K j o : g, we construct a judgement in C Der whose term is of the form t 0 ; 0 ] (x:K 0 ) 0 where 0 is derived from a proof named as o t] in the context ?; . The de nition follows closely that of the conversion to canonical form (Section 3.1). Note that o t] may be de ned in or, in the case where t is a variable y, may occur in an item y : fx : K j o : g in the context ?. The map K is a partial function, there may not be su cient information in a judgement of C Env to construct a judgement in C Der , in particular, a look-up via an operator may fail. We will show that K is de ned on derivable judgements.
De nition 4.1 On judgements of the form ?; `t : K, the translation K is de ned by: K(?; `t : K 1 K 2 ) = ? 0`h t 0 1 ; t 0 2 i : K 0 Finally, we introduce a correspondence E between derivations in C Env and judgements in C Der . De nition 4.2 De ne E by structural induction on the derivations in C Env . Most of the rules for C Env are those of C Der modi ed with proof environments and the de nition of E is immediate for these rules. Only the rules for proof environments and class comprehension need special attention. We de ne E on these rules as follows. For the assumption rule for proof environments, The following proposition describes the requisite properties of the conversions K from judgements and E from derivations.
Proposition 4.1 If derivation D establishes judgement J in C Env , then judgement K(J) is de ned and C(E(D)) K(J) (syntactically identical), where C is the conversion to canonical form (Section 3.1).
Proof. Note that the proposition says that K(J) is in canonical form and is equal to E(J) in the equational theory of C Der .
The proof proceeds by structural induction on the derivation D. The RHS is equal in C Der to ? 00`t00 : K 00 which is K(?; `t : K). Moreover, by De nition 3.1 (the de nition of canonical form), because ? 00` t 00 ; 00 ] (x:K 00 ) 00 : fx : K 00 j 00 g is canonical, then so is ? 00`t00 : K 00 . Hence,
as required.
We are now in a position to give a general coherence result for C Env . We phrase this in the form of a principle for the well-de nedness of functions on C Env . We now use this method for de ning maps to give a semantics of the system C Env via a semantics of C Der .
Models
We begin by de ning categorical models for the system C Der . There is a standard interpretation of rst order logics in indexed categories and brations (see, for example, or Jacobs 1990] ), where terms denote arrows in the base category and proofs (or entailment relations) denote arrows in the bres. We extend this to include class comprehension using comprehension schemata in indexed categories. We present here a simple form of the semantics using strict indexed categories (i.e. functors p : C op ! Cat). It is possible to remove the strictness requirement so that the indexed category is functorial only up to isomorphism (as in Lawvere 1970] ), or consider comprehension schemata in brations as in Jacobs 1990], Jacobs 1991] . The language C Der may be interpreted in these models, some of the equations being interpreted as isomorphisms.
Indexed categories and comprehension
A strict indexed category is a functor p : C op ! Cat. For indexed category p : C op ! Cat, C is the base category and p(K) the bre over K. For arrow s in the base, we write s for the functor p(s) when p is understood. The composition of arrows in categories is written as`;' in diagrammatic order.
We introduce a simple form of comprehension schema:
De nition 5.1 Let p : C op ! Cat be an indexed category such that each bre p(K) has a terminal object > K preserved under the functors s . A comprehension schema in p consists of 1. for each object L of C a functor taking objects in p(L) to objects fL j g in C and taking arrows : ! 0 to arrows fL j g : fL j g ! fL j 0 g. 
The corresponding equations for are:
L; 0 (g; fL j g) = L; (g); s
which are equivalent to (1) and (2) given that and are inverse.
A semantics of C Der
Models for the interpretation C Der are to be strict indexed categories with a comprehension schema and nite products in the base category and in the bres, those in the bres being strictly preserved by the functors s . The terminal object in the base is denoted 1 with terminal arrows 1 K : K ! 1 and the binary product in the base is . In each bre p(K), the terminal object is denoted > K with terminal arrows > : ! > K and binary product is denotes^. In the base category and in the bres, product pairing is h ; i and projections are j K 1 ;K 2 (j = 1; 2). For a signature , a -structure in such an indexed category p consists of an interpretation for each symbol in . In detail, (1) This semantics is also complete { we may construct a classifying model p : C op ! Cat from the syntax of C Der in a standard way, as long as we add nite products of propositions and a terminal class 1 and associated rules (or change the syntax for classes to be f? j g or even f? j g). Objects in C are constructed from derivable judgements`K class under C Der -equality. Arrows from`? class to`K class are derivable judgements ?`t : K under C Der -equality. Objects in the bre over`? class are constructed from derivable judgements ?` prop under C Der -equality. Arrows in the bre from ?` prop to ?` prop are derivable judgements ?; ` : under C Der -equality. The results in Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 ensure that this is well-de ned. Class comprehension in C Der de nes a comprehension schema in this indexed category.
A semantics of C Env
After this rather lengthy exposition, we are now in a position to give a semantics of C Env . To do so, we use the relationship of C Der to C Env , the coherence result for de ning maps from C Env , and the above semantics of C Der . De ne the semantics of a derivation D of a judgement J in C Env to be E ( An equational theory for the language C Env has no role in the development. We could however, formulate such an equational theory { it would be useful, for example when comparing an operational semantics of C Env with this denotational semantics. The equational theory could include -and -rules as well as the equations in the proof environments. Soundness for these equations follows from the soundness of the semantics of C Der and the treatment of proof environments in C Env .
One of the starting points for this paper was an attempt to give a semantics for languages of type classes in terms of comprehension schemata in categories. Any such attempt requires formalising a language of type classes and a coherence result to show that the semantics is properly de ned. In Hilken, Rydeheard 1992], we de ned a semantics directly, starting with a language with unusual features which were di cult to justify except by comparison with existing languages. The coherence was established through rewriting categorical expressions. Whilst coherence results are often treated categorically, in this case the proof looked opaque.
Here, the treatment is more elaborate: we introduce an underlying logical system C and an intermediate language of derivations C Der . This enables us to give some justi cation for the form of the language of type classes and provides a medium, C Der , in which to state and prove coherence using more familiar normalisation methods. For this correspondence to make sense, we consider systems with a distinguished class (to be thought of as the class of all types) and a bijective rule between judgements ?`t : and judgements ?`t : prop, or, indeed, drop judgements of the form ?` : prop altogether as in Hilken, Rydeheard 1992] . This follows the standard treatment of programming languages as rst order systems and so called \hyperdoctrine models" (see , for example).
Following this interpretation, C Env is a language of type classes with the same basic type structure as introduced in Wadler, Blott 1989] and implemented in Haskell Hudak, Wadler 1990] and Gofer Jones 1992] . To illustrate this, we revisit the running example of the paper (Example 2.1) and give a corresponding fragment of Haskell. Recall (Example 4.1) that we gave a The syntax di ers from that in a formal system. In the program, we incrementally build classes in terms of previous classes, naming the class built at each stage. Thus C1 corresponds to the class fx : A j o 1 : P A (x)g. The class C2, which is built from C1, corresponds to fy : fx : K j o 1 : P A (x)g j o 2 : P A (y)g and C corresponds to fx : A j o : P A (x)g. The instance declaration in the program shows how any type z of class C2 may be considered to be of class C by de ning the operator o in in terms of o1. This correspond to the above judgement in C Env .
In Jones 1992] , there is a detailed analysis of functional languages with type classes. A proof is given of the correctness of a compiler { a translation from a language with implicit evidence' to one with explicit`evidence'. A coherence result is required and, to this end, an equational theory of judgements is introduced with both -and -rules. The analysis is, in overall structure, that of the relationship between C Env and C Der in this paper, although details di er. Jones 1992] is somewhat more general, especially in the treatment of parametric polymorphism, but lacks the underlying logical systems of this paper.
Other related work includes Curien, Ghelli 1990 ] which examines coherence for languages with explicit subtyping; Bailey 1996] which introduces implicit type conversions into the type system LEGO and Nipkow, Snelting 1990 ] which deals with the overloading mechanism in type classes using order-sorted algebra.
Conclusions
This has been a fairly lengthly exercise in understanding a feature of programming languages from a logical viewpoint. The treatment revolved around an underlying logical system C and a correspondence between its derivations and programs in a (prototype) programming language. Because the language has a form of polymorphism in which types may belong to more than one class, this correspondence involves a`coherence' result.
There is clearly more to do using this approach. The language C Env is rather rudimentary as a programming language. It has neither function abstraction nor recursion (but see Section 3.3). Although it has type variables, it lacks ML-style polymorphism and 8 type quanti cation.
To introduce this polymorphism requires a modi ed de nition of the well-formedness of proof environments as described in Jones 1992] . Other extensions include adding classi cations of type constructors, as in Jones 1996 ]. This involves a lambda calculus of types: in the categorical treatment, a cartesian closed base category.
Other interesting avenues to explore include linear versions of classes, and, more speculatively, languages of records and variants, and features of object-oriented languages, viewed from this proof-theoretic perspective.
